Cloud storage is very popular since it has many advantages, but there is a new threat to cloud storage that was not considered before. Self-updatable encryption that updates a past ciphertext to a future ciphertext by using a public key is a new cryptographic primitive introduced by Lee, Choi, Lee, Park, and Yung (Asiacrypt 2013) to defeat this threat, in which an adversary who obtained a past private key can still decrypt a (previously unread) past ciphertext stored in cloud storage. Additionally, an SUE scheme can be combined with an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme to construct a powerful revocable-storage ABE (RS-ABE) scheme introduced by Sahai, Seyalioglu, and Waters (Crypto 2012) that provides the key revocation and ciphertext updating functionality for cloud storage. In this paper, we propose an efficient SUE scheme and its extended schemes. First, we propose an SUE scheme with short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups and prove its security under a q-type assumption. Next, we extend our SUE scheme to a time-interval SUE (TI-SUE) scheme that supports a time interval in ciphertexts. Our TI-SUE scheme has short public parameters and it is also secure under the q-type assumption. Finally, we propose the first large universe RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups and prove its security in the selective revocation list model under a q-type assumption.
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Introduction
Cloud storage is very popular in these days since the cost of service is low, data management is easy, and data can be accessed through the internet without the restriction of a geographical location. If data that contains sensitive information is stored in cloud storage, then this data should be encrypted as a ciphertext. To provide an access control on these ciphertexts, each ciphertext is specified with a time T , and then a user who has a master key can delegate his key to other delegator by giving a (delegated) private key with a time T that only can be used to decrypt a ciphertext with the same time T . In typical communication systems, this simple method can reduce the damage caused by the exposure of the delegated private key with a time T since a ciphertext is only used during a short time period and an adversary who obtained a private key with T cannot decrypt a ciphertext with a time T where T = T . However, this adversary can cause a serious problem in cloud storage since ciphertexts are stored in cloud storage at all times and the adversary who has a past private key can still decrypt a (previously unread) past ciphertext. This problem is a new threat to cloud storage.
A naive approach to solve this problem is for cloud storage to keep the master key of a user and to encrypt a past ciphertext into a new one after decrypting it by using the master key. However, this simple approach requires for us to trust cloud storage and the master key in cloud storage can be an easy target of attackers. A better solution for this problem is for cloud storage to keep only the public key of a user and to update a past ciphertext to a new one by using the public key. Self-updatable encryption (SUE), introduced by Lee et al. [14] , is a new cryptographic primitive that provides this functionality. In SUE, a ciphertext is associated with a time T and a private key is also associated with a time T . If T ≤ T , then the ciphertext with T can be decrypted by the private key with T . Additionally, the ciphertext with T can be updated to a new one with T + 1 by just using public parameters. Lee et al. proposed an efficient SUE scheme in bilinear groups and also constructed an efficient revocable-storage attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE) scheme that provides the key revocation and ciphertext updating functionality for cloud storage. SUE also can be used for timed-release encryption (TRE) and key-insulated encryption (KIE) [14] .
The previous SUE schemes of Lee et al. have O(log T max ) group elements in public parameters if composite-order bilinear groups are used or O(T max ) group elements in public parameters if prime-order bilinear groups are used where T max is the maximum number of times. We ask whether there is a practical SUE scheme that has short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups.
Our Results
In this paper, we propose an efficient SUE scheme and its extended schemes by modifying the previous SUE scheme. The followings are our results: SUE with short public parameters. We first propose an efficient SUE scheme in prime-order bilinear groups that has constant number of group elements in public parameters and prove its security under a qtype assumption. Compared with the previous SUE schemes of Lee et al. [14] that have O(log T max ) (or O(T max )) group elements in public parameters, our SUE scheme has just O(1) group elements in public parameters, and the number of group elements in a private key and a ciphertext is O(log T max ) and O(log T max ) respectively as the same as that of previous SUE schemes. To devise an SUE scheme with short public parameters, we add additional layer that has a new randomness to the structure of a private key. This added new layer enables the simulation of a polynomial number of private keys, and the power of a q-type assumption reduces the number of group elements in public parameters.
Time-Interval SUE with short parameters. One natural extension of SUE is to specify a time interval in a ciphertext. By extending our SUE scheme, we propose a time-interval SUE (TI-SUE) scheme with short public parameters, in which a ciphertext is associated with a time interval. In TI-SUE, a ciphertext is specified with a time interval [T L , T R ] and a private key with a time T can be used to decrypt this ciphertext if T L ≤ T ≤ T R . To devise a TI-SUE scheme, we combine two SUE schemes by using a simple secret sharing scheme to prevent collusion attacks, and prove its security under a q-type assumption. To prove the security, we introduce a meta-simulation technique that uses previous simulators of SUE schemes as sub-simulators to simplify the security proof. This meta-simulation technique has an independent interest. RS-ABE with short parameters. The main application of SUE is RS-ABE for cloud storage that provides the key revocation and ciphertext updating functionality if SUE is combined with ABE. Sahai, Seyalioglu, and Waters [24] introduced the concept of RS-ABE and Lee et al. [14] showed that an efficient RS-ABE scheme can be constructed from an SUE scheme. We propose a large universe RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups by combining the ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [23] and our SUE scheme, and then we prove its selective revocation list security under the q-type assumption introduced by Rouselakis and Waters. Our RS-ABE scheme is the first efficient RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters that supports a large universe of attributes. We can also construct an RS-ABE scheme that supports a time interval by using our TI-SUE scheme. Additionally, we propose an RS-ABE scheme with key-policy by combining our SUE scheme with the key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme of Rouselakis and Waters.
Related Work
SUE is related with timed-release encryption (TRE) since private keys and ciphertexts are associated with times. In TRE, a ciphertext is specified with a releasing time T and a private key with a time T is broadcasted to all users by a trusted-center periodically at each time T . The ciphertext with T can be decrypted by the private key with T if T ≤ T . The concept of TRE was introduced by May [18] and its extensions were proposed in [21, 22] . As mentioned, an SUE scheme can be easily converted to a TRE scheme by using the ciphertext updating property and TI-SUE is related with time-specific encryption (TSE) [13, 21] . One notable difference between TRE and SUE is that a past private key that was broadcasted is used to decrypt a past ciphertext in TRE, whereas a current private key is used to decrypt a past ciphertext by updating the ciphertext in SUE.
SUE is also related with key-insulated encryption (KIE) and forward-secure encryption (FSE) that mitigate the damage of key exposure. In KIE, a master key is stored in a physically secure device and a temporal key for a time T derived from the master key is used to decrypt a ciphertext with a time T if T = T . Note that the exposure of a temporal key with a time T does not damage the ciphertext security at a time T if T = T . The concept of KIE was introduced by Dodis et al. [10] and its extension was presented in [9] . As mentioned before, SUE can be used to enhance the ciphertext security of KIE by updating ciphertexts if these are stored in cloud storage. In FSE, a private key with a time T is evolved to another private key with a next time T + 1 at each time period, and then the past private key is erased. The forward security ensures that an exposed private key with a time T cannot be used to decrypt a past ciphertext with a time T if T < T . The first FSE scheme was proposed by Canetti et al. [7] by using a hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme and an efficient FSE scheme was presented in [3] . We may view SUE as the dual concept of FSE since the role of private keys and that of ciphertexts are reversed.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) that generates a delegated key for an identity is related with SUE since a delegated (or limited) private key for a time T is generated for a user in SUE. In IBE, a ciphertext is associated with an identity ID and a private key with ID can be used to decrypt this ciphertext if ID = ID .
The first IBE scheme was presented by Boneh and Franklin [4] by using bilinear maps and other IBE schemes were proposed in [2, 27] . IBE also can be extended to HIBE, ABE, predicate encryption (PE), and functional encryption (FE) [5, 6, 11, 12] . To minimize the damage of private key exposure in IBE, the revocation functionality that can revoked a user is required. An efficient revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme was proposed by Boldyreva et al. [1] and its improvement was presented in [15, 17, 20, 25, 26] . Sahai et al. [24] introduced the concept of RS-ABE for cloud storage and Lee et al. [14] presented an improved RS-ABE and RS-PE schemes by using an SUE scheme.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the definition of self-updatable encryption and give the necessary background of bilinear groups and complexity assumptions.
Notation
We let λ be a security parameter. Let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N. For a string L ∈ {0, 1} n , let L[i] be the ith bit of L, and L| i be the prefix of L with i-bit length. For example, if L = 010, then
Self-Updatable Encryption
Self-updatable encryption (SUE) is a new type of public-key encryption such that a ciphertext associated with a time can be updated to a future time by using public parameters, and the concept of this primitive was introduced by Lee et al. [14] . We follow the SUE definition of Lee et al. In SUE, a ciphertext associated with a time T is stored in a cloud storage. A user who has a private key associated with a time T can decrypt a ciphertext with a time T in the cloud storage if T ≤ T . Additional feature of SUE is that a ciphertext with a time T can be easily converted to a new time T + 1 by the cloud storage to prevent a user who has a past private key from accessing the ciphertext in the cloud storage. The formal syntax of SUE is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Self-Updatable Encryption). A self-updatable encryption (SUE) scheme consists of seven PPT algorithms Init, Setup, GenKey, Encrypt, UpdateCT, RandCT, and Decrypt, which are defined as follows:
Init(1 λ ). The initialization algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , and it outputs a group description string GDS.
Setup(GDS, T max ). The setup algorithm takes as input a group description string GDS and the maximum time T max , and it outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
GenKey(T, MK, PP)
. The key generation algorithm takes as input a time T , the master key MK, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a private key SK T .
Encrypt(T, PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input a time T and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a ciphertext header CH T and a session key EK.
UpdateCT(CH T , T + 1, PP). The ciphertext update algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH T for a time T , a next time T + 1, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs an updated ciphertext header CH T +1 .
RandCT(CH T , PP). The ciphertext randomization algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH T for a time T and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a re-randomized ciphertext header CH T and a partial session key EK .
Decrypt(CH T , SK T , PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH T , a private key SK T , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a session key EK or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
The correctness of SUE is defined as follows: For all MK, PP generated by Setup, any SK T generated by GenKey, and any CH T and EK generated by Encrypt or UpdateCT, it is required that:
• If T > T , then Decrypt(CH T , SK T , PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
Additionally, it requires that the ciphertext distribution of RandCT is statistically equal to that of Encrypt.
The security model of SUE was introduced by Lee et al. [14] and we use a selective security model in which an adversary initially submits a challenge time T * . In the selective security game, an adversary initially submits a challenge time T * and receives public parameters. After that, he may request private keys for a time that is less than the challenge time. In a challenge step, he is given a ciphertext header and a challenge session key that is a well-formed one or a random one depending on a random coin. Additionally he can request private keys and he finally outputs a coin guess. If the guess is correct, then he wins the game. The formal definition is given as follows: Definition 2.2 (Selective Security). The selective security of SUE is defined in terms of the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The security game is defined as the following experiment between a challenger C and a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A:
1. Init: A initially submits a challenge time T * . 2. Setup: C generates a master key MK and public parameters PP by running Init and Setup, and it gives PP to A.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the game. An SUE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the above game is negligible in the security parameter λ .
We can also define the full model that is stronger than the selective model of SUE. In the full model, an adversary submits a challenge time T * at the challenge step instead of the init step.
Full Binary Tree
A full binary tree BT is a tree data structure where each node except the leaf nodes has two child nodes. Let N be the number of leaf nodes in BT . The number of all nodes in BT is 2N − 1. For any index 0 ≤ i < 2N − 1, we denote by v i a node in BT . We assign the index 0 to the root node and assign other indices to other nodes by using breadth-first search. That is, if a node v has an index i, then the index of its left child node is 2i + 1 and the index of its right child node is 2i + 2, while the index of its parent node (if any) is i−1 2 . The depth of a node v i is the length of the path from the root node to the node. The root node is at depth zero. The depth of BT is the depth of a leaf node. A level of BT is a set of all nodes at given depth. Siblings are nodes that share the same parent node.
For any node v i ∈ BT , L is defined as a label that is a fixed and unique string. The label of each node in the tree is assigned as follows: Each edge in the tree is assigned with 0 or 1 depending on whether the edge is connected to its left or right child node. The label L of a node v i is defined as the bit string obtained by reading all the labels of edges in the path from the root node to the node v i . Note that we assign a special empty string to the root node as a label. We define L(i) be a mapping from the index i of a node v i to a label L. Note that there is a simple mapping between the index i and the label L of a node v i such that
For the notational convenience, we define additional functions in a full binary tree. Parent(L) is a function that returns the parent node's label L of the input node with the label L. RightChild(L) is a function that returns the right child's label L of the input node with L. RightSibling(L) is a function that returns the right sibling node's label L of the input node with L. That is, RightSibling(L) = RightChild(Parent(L)). Finally, Path(L) is a function that returns a set of path node's labels from the root node to the input node with L.
Bilinear Groups
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of same prime order p and g be a generator of G. The bilinear map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1, that is, e(g, g) is a generator of G T .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and G T includes generators of G and G T respectively.
Complexity Assumptions
In this subsection, we introduce a q-type assumption and the standard assumption for the proof of our schemes. Before introducing our q-type assumption, we first introduce the q-RW1 assumption that was introduced by Rouselakis and Waters [23] to prove the security of their ciphertext-policy ABE scheme. Our q-sRW1 assumption is a simplified version of the q-RW1 assumption. The DBDH assumption is the standard assumption that was extensively used in the proof of other schemes. Assumption 2.3 (q-RW1, [23] ). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. The q-RW1 assumption is that if the challenge tuple
and Z, are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) a q+1 c from Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) f with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, c, {d j } 1≤ j≤q , f ∈ Z p .
Lemma 2.4 ( [23]
). The q-RW1 assumption holds in the generic group model. Assumption 2.5 (q-simplified RW1, q-sRW1). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. The q-sRW1 assumption is that if the challenge tuple
and Z, are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc from Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) f with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c, {d
Lemma 2.6. The q-sRW1 assumption holds in the generic group model if the q-RW1 assumption holds in the generic group model.
The proof of this Lemma is easily obtained since all elements of the q-sRW1 assumption can be derived from the elements of the q-RW1 assumption by simply setting b = a q where b is a random element in the q-sRW1 assumption and q is a parameter in the q-RW1 assumption. That is, if there exists an adversary A that attacks the q-sRW1 assumption, then there exists an algorithm B that attacks the q-RW1 assumption by using A since B can derive all elements of the q-sRW1 assumption from that of the q-RW1 assumption. Assumption 2.7 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, DBDH, [4] ). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. The DBDH assumption is that if the challenge tuple D = (p, G, G T , e), g, g a , g b , g c and Z, are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc from Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) d with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c, d ∈ Z p .
Self-Updatable Encryption with Short Parameters
In this section, we propose an SUE scheme with short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups and prove its security under a q-type assumption.
Design Principle
To devise an SUE scheme that supports the ciphertext updating property, we follow the design principle of Lee et al. [14] that constructs an SUE scheme from a ciphertext delegatable encryption (CDE) scheme that supports the ciphertext delegation property by carefully reusing the randomness of the CDE ciphertexts. Lee et al. derived a CDE scheme from the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [2] by switching the structure of private keys and that of ciphertexts, but this CDE scheme can not be easily proven by using the partitioning method since a polynomial number of private keys cannot be simulated. To solve this problem, they constructed a CDE scheme in composite-order bilinear groups and proved its security by using the dual system encryption method of Waters [28] . Note that they also proposed a CDE scheme in prime-order groups and proved its security in the partitioning method, but the size of public parameters is depend on the number of tree nodes.
The main reason of this difficulty that prevents the security proof of their CDE scheme by using the partitioning method is that only one private key of CDE can be simulated since the structure of CDE private keys is derived from the structure of HIBE ciphertexts. Note that only one challenge ciphertext of HIBE is simulated in the security proof of HIBE. To solve this difficult problem, we add an additional layer that has new local randomness to the structure of private keys. This added layer has the similar structure as the private key of Boneh and Boyen's IBE [2] . By adding this additional layer, we can easily simulate private keys since the local randomness of a private key in Boneh and Boyen's IBE can be used to cancel out an element that cannot be simulated. To achieve constant size of public parameters, we use a q-type assumption since multiple values can be programmed in shorter public parameters by the power of this q-type assumption.
Construction
Our CDE scheme in prime-order bilinear groups is described as follows:
CDE.Init(1 λ ): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ . It generates bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. It outputs a group description string as GDS = (p, G, G T , e), g .
CDE.Setup(GDS, l):
This algorithm takes as input the string GDS and the maximum length l of label strings. It chooses random elements w, v, u, h ∈ G and a random exponent β ∈ Z p . It outputs a master key MK = β and public parameters as
CDE.GenKey(L, MK, PP): This algorithm takes as input a label string L ∈ {0, 1} n , the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents r, r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and outputs a private key that implicitly includes L as
, an exponent δ ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents r , r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and outputs a re-randomized private key as 
.
and a session key as EK = Λ t .
CDE.DelegateCT(CH L , c, PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header
for a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d where d < l, a bit value c ∈ {0, 1}, and the public parameters PP. It selects a random exponent s d+1 ∈ Z p and outputs a delegated ciphertext header for a new label string L = L c as
, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a re-randomized ciphertext header as
and a partial session key as EK = Λ t that will be multiplied with the session key EK of CH L .
) for a label L ∈ {0, 1} n , and the public parameters
) by iteratively running DelegateCT and outputs a session key as
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Let BT be a full binary tree with a depth l. For each node in BT , a unique time is assigned by using the pre-order traversal. That is, the root node is assigned to 1 and the right most leaf node is assigned to 2 l+1 − 1. Let ψ be a mapping from a time T to a label L by the pre-order traversal. We define TimeLabels(L) = {L} ∪ RightSibling(Path(L)) \ Path(Parent(L)). Our SUE scheme is almost the same as that of Lee et al. [14] since a ciphertext with a label L consists of CDE ciphertexts where each CDE ciphertext is associated with a label in TimeLabels(L). Our SUE scheme that uses the above CDE scheme is described as follows:
This algorithm outputs GDS by running CDE.Init(1 λ ).
SUE.Setup(GDS, T max ):
This algorithm outputs MK and PP by running CDE.Setup(GDS, l) where T max = 2 l+1 − 1.
SUE.GenKey(T, MK, PP):
This algorithm outputs SK T by running CDE.GenKey(ψ(T ), MK, PP).
SUE.RandKey(SK T , δ , PP):
This algorithm outputs SK T by running CDE.RandKey(SK T , δ , PP).
SUE.Encrypt(T,t, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a time T , a random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It proceeds as follows:
1. It first sets a label L ∈ {0, 1} d by computing ψ(T ). It sets an exponent vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s d ) by selecting random exponents s 1 , . . . , s d ∈ Z p , and obtains 
It also prunes redundant elements
, which are already contained in CH (0) .
It removes all empty CH ( j) and sets
4. It outputs a ciphertext header that implicitly includes T as CH T and a session key as EK = Λ t . Note that CH ( j) are ordered according to pre-order traversal. 
SUE.UpdateCT(CH
2. Otherwise, it copies common elements in CH (0) to CH (1) and simply removes CH (0) since CH (1) is the ciphertext header for the next time T + 1 by pre-order traversal. It outputs an updated ciphertext header as
SUE.RandCT(CH T ,t , PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header
for a time T , a new random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. Let L ( j) be the label of CH ( j) and d ( j) be the length of the label L ( j) . It proceeds as follows: 
is a prefix of L = ψ(T ) and outputs EK by running CDE.Decrypt(CH ( j) , SK T , PP). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Correctness
Let SK L be a private key with a label L and CH L be a ciphertext header with a label L. If L is a prefix of L , then the ciphertext delegation algorithm can be used to derive a ciphertext header CH L . The correctness of CDE is satisfied by the following equation
The correctness of SUE can be obtained from the property of the pre-order traversal and the correctness of CDE. Let SK T be a private key with a time T and CH T be a ciphertext header with a time
0 from the property of the pre-order traversal where L is associated with T and L is associated with T . Therefore, a correct session key can be derived from the correctness of CDE by using the decryption algorithm of CDE since L is a prefix of L .
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our SUE scheme, we use the partitioning method that was widely used to prove other schemes. In SUE, a challenge ciphertext for the time T * is associated with labels in TimeLabels(L * ) where L * is associated with T * . In the security proof that uses the partitioning method, these labels should be programmed in short public parameters. To programming these labels in short public parameters, we use a q-type assumption. A q-type assumption was previously used for this purpose in [16, 23, 29] . The detailed security proof is described as follows:
Theorem 3.1. The above SUE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-sRW1 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above SUE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the q-sRW1 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
) and
Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge time T * . B first obtains a challenge label string L * that is associated with T * by computing L * = ψ(T * ). Recall that TimeLabels(L * ) is the set of label strings that consists of L * and the right sibling labels of path nodes of L * that are not in the parent's path. That is, TimeLabels(
We define TL(L * , j) be a function that returns the jth label string in TimeLabels(L * ) where l * is the maximum number of label strings in TimeLabels(L * ).
Setup: B first chooses random exponents w , v , u , h ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets β = ab and publishes the public parameters PP as
Query 1: A adaptively request a private key for a time T with the restriction T < T * . B first obtains a label L ∈ {0, 1} n by computing ψ(T ). Next, it selects random exponents r , r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and creates a private key by implicitly setting r = −b + r ,
Note that if T < T * , then it can create a private key
To create the challenge ciphertext for the challenge time T * , B proceeds as follows:
4. It sets the challenger ciphertext header as CH T * = CH T and the session key EK = Z. It gives CH T * and EK to A.
Note that it can create the challenge ciphertext for T * since L ( j) ∈ TimeLabels(L * ) for all label strings L ( j) in the challenge ciphertext. Query 2: Same as Query 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess µ . B also outputs µ .
To finish the proof, we should show that the simulation is correct. The private key is correctly distributed as
that is not given in the assumption is cancelled. The challenge ciphertext component CH ( j) is also correctly distributed as
Note that the term g ac of C 1 is cancelled and the term
. This completes our proof.
Corollary 3.2. The above SUE scheme is fully secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-sRW 1 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv T max log T max 3 log T max log T max P Selective DBDH Ours 6 2 log T max 5 log T max 2 log T max P Selective q-Type Ours 2 log T max 2 log T max 5 log T max 2 log T max P Selective DBDH Let T max be the maximum number of times. Sizes for public parameters (PP), private keys (SK), and ciphertexts (CT) count group elements. P stands for pairing computation.
Discussions
Efficiency Analysis. In our SUE scheme, the public parameters consist of six group elements, a private key consists of at most 2 log T max + 2 group elements, and a ciphertext header consists of at most 5 log T max + 2 group elements where T max is the maximum number of times. The decryption algorithm of SUE consists of at most 2 log T max + 2 pairing operations with additional exponentiations. Compared with the SUE scheme of Lee et al. [14] in which the public parameters consist of O(log T max ) group elements in composite-order groups, the public parameters of our SUE scheme is compact since it consists of just O(1) group elements in prime-order groups. The comparison of SUE schemes is given in Table 1 .
Full Model Security. The security of our SUE scheme is proven in the selective model where an adversary should initially submit a challenge time before he receives public parameters. In the full security model, the adversary first receives public parameters and he submits the challenge time in the challenge step. If the maximum number of time T max is a polynomial value, then a selectively secure SUE scheme can be converted to a fully secure one with reduction loss T max .
Standard Assumption. Our SUE scheme is secure under the q-sRW1 assumption where q is dependent on the depth of a binary tree. This q-type assumption is a stronger one compared with the well-known standard assumption. Thus an SUE scheme secure under the standard assumption is desired. If we increase the size of public parameters in our SUE scheme, then we can obtain an SUE scheme that is secure under the DBDH assumption. This SUE scheme is described in Appendix B. Note that this scheme has O(log T max ) group elements in public parameters whereas the scheme of Lee et al. [14] in prime-order groups has O(T max ) group elements in public parameters. Independent of our work, Datta et al. [8] proposed a fully-secure SUE scheme under standard assumptions.
Self-Updatable Encryption for Time Intervals
In this section, we introduce the concept of time-interval SUE (TI-SUE) such that a ciphertext is associated with a time-interval and propose an efficient TI-SUE scheme by extending our SUE scheme. Note that the idea of TI-SUE was introduced by Lee et al. [14] , but we give the formal definition and the security analysis of a TI-SUE scheme.
Definitions
Time-interval SUE (TI-SUE) is an interesting extension of SUE, in which the time of a ciphertext can be specified by a time-interval. That is, the ciphertext of TI-SUE is associated with times T L and T R and a private key with a time T can be used to decrypt this ciphertext if T L ≤ T ≤ T R . The formal syntax of TI-SUE is given as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Time-Interval Self-Updatable Encryption, TI-SUE). A time-interval self-updatable encryption (TI-SUE) scheme consists of seven PPT algorithms Init, Setup, GenKey, Encrypt, UpdateCT, RandCT, and Decrypt, which are defined as follows:
GenKey(T, MK, PP)
RandKey(SK T , δ , PP). The key randomization algorithm takes as input a private key SK T , an exponent δ , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a re-randomized private key SK T .
Encrypt(T L , T R , PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input a left time T L , a right time T R , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a ciphertext header CH T L ,T R and a session key EK. RandCT(CH T L ,T R , PP). The ciphertext randomization algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH T for a time T and the public parameters PP, and it outputs an re-randomized ciphertext header CH T and a partial session key EK .
Decrypt(CH T L ,T R , SK T , PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH T L ,T R , a private key SK T , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a session key EK or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
The correctness of TI-SUE is defined as follows: For all MK, PP generated by Setup, any SK T generated by GenKey, and any CH T and EK generated by Encrypt or UpdateCT, it is required that:
•
=⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The security of TI-SUE can be defined by following the security of SUE except that the challenge ciphertext is specified by a time interval. In this case, an adversary is allowed to request a polynomial number of private keys for times that are not in the challenge time interval. The formal definition of the selective security is given as follows: Definition 4.2 (Selective Security). The selective security of TI-SUE is defined in terms of the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The security game is defined as the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
2. Setup: C generates a master key MK and public parameters PP by running Init and Setup, and it gives PP to A.
Query 1:
A may adaptively request a polynomial number of private keys for times T 1 , . . . , T q , and C gives the corresponding private keys SK T 1 , . . . , SK T q to A by running GenKey(T i , MK, PP) with the following restriction: For any time T i of private key queries, it is required that T i < T * L or T * R < T i .
4.
Challenge: C chooses a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and computes a ciphertext header CH * and a session key EK * by running Encrypt(T * L , T * R , PP). If µ = 0, then it gives CH * and EK * to A. Otherwise, it gives CH * and a random session key to A.
Query 2:
A may continue to request private keys for additional times T q +1 , . . . , T q subject to the same restriction as before, and C gives the corresponding private keys to A.
6.
Guess: Finally A outputs a bit µ .
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the game. A TI-SUE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the above game is negligible in the security parameter λ .
We can also define the full model that is stronger than the selective model of TI-SUE. In the full model, an adversary submits challenge times T * L , T * R at the challenge step instead of the init step.
Construction
Before describing our TI-SUE scheme, we define a future SUE (F-SUE) scheme and a past SUE (P-SUE) scheme. F-SUE is the same as SUE that is defined in Section 2.2 in which the time T of a ciphertext is updated to a future time T + 1. P-SUE is similar to F-SUE except that the time T of a ciphertext is updated to a past time T − 1. A P-SUE scheme can be also constructed from a CDE scheme similarly to the F-SUE scheme if a time for a tree node is assigned in a decreasing order from the maximum time T max by following the pre-order traversal. The security model of P-SUE is also similarly defined and the security proof of P-SUE is easily obtained since the proof is almost the same as that of F-SUE except that the order of times is reversed. The design idea of a TI-SUE scheme from SUE schemes is to combine an F-SUE scheme and a P-SUE scheme by sharing the master key to prevent collusion attacks. That is, if the ciphertext of F-SUE is associated with a left time T L and the ciphertext of P-SUE is associated with a right time T R , then a private key with T that satisfies T L ≤ T ≤ T R only can be used to decrypt the ciphertext of F-SUE and that of P-SUE. This idea was presented by Lee et al. [14] without an actual scheme and the security proof.
Our TI-SUE scheme that uses F-SUE and P-SUE schemes is described as follows:
TI-SUE.Init(1 λ ): This algorithm outputs GDS by running SUE.Init(1 λ ).
TI-SUE.Setup(GDS, T max ):
This algorithm first obtains MK F-SUE , PP F-SUE and MK P-SUE , PP P-SUE by running F-SUE.Setup(GDS, T max ) and P-SUE.Setup(GDS, T max ) respectively. It selects a random exponent β ∈ Z p and outputs a master key MK = β and public parameters PP = PP F-SUE , PP P-SUE , Ω = e(g, g) β .
TI-SUE.GenKey(T, MK, PP): Let MK = β . It first selects a random exponent β ∈ Z p and obtains SK F-SUE,T and SK P-SUE,T by running F-SUE.GenKey(T, β , PP F-SUE ) and P-SUE.GenKey(T, MK −β , PP P-SUE ) respectively. It outputs a private key as SK T = SK F-SUE,T , SK P-SUE,T .
TI-SUE.RandKey(SK T , δ , PP): Let SK T = (SK F-SUE,T , SK P-SUE,T ). It selects a random exponent δ ∈ Z p and obtains SK F-SUE,T and SK P-SUE,T by running F-SUE.RandKey(SK F-SUE,T , δ , PP F-SUE ) and P-SUE.RandKey(SK P-SUE,T , δ − δ , PP P-SUE ) respectively. It outputs a re-randomized private key as
and CH P-SUE,T R , EK P-SUE by running F-SUE.RandCT(CH F-SUE,T L ,t , PP F-SUE ) and P-SUE.RandCT (CH P-SUE,T R ,t , PP P-SUE ) respectively. It outputs a re-randomized ciphertext header as CH T L ,T R = CH F-SUE,T L ,CH P-SUE,T R and a partial session key as EK = EK F-SUE · EK P-SUE .
If T L ≤ T ≤ T R , then it obtains EK F-SUE and EK P-SUE by running F-SUE.Decrypt(CH F-SUE,T L , SK F-SUE,T , PP F-SUE ) and P-SUE.Decrypt(CH P-SUE,T R , SK P-SUE,T , PP P-SUE ) respectively and outputs EK = EK F-SUE · EK P-SUE . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Correctness
The correctness of TI-SUE is obtained from the correctness of F-SUE and P-SUE. Let SK T = (SK F−SUE,T , SK P−SUE,T ) be a private key with a time T and
Note that SK F−SUE,T and SK P−SUE have β and β − β as a shared key respectively by using a simple addictive secret sharing scheme where β is the master key. If T L ≤ T ≤ T R , then one partial session key e(g, g) β t is correctly derived from the correctness of F-SUE and another partial session key e(g, g) (β −β )t is also derived from the correctness of P-SUE. The final session key e(g, g) βt is obtained by multiplying two partial session keys.
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our TI-SUE scheme, we can use the partitioning method as the same as the proof of our SUE scheme to show that private keys and the challenge ciphertext header are correctly simulated by using the q-sRW1 assumption. To simplify this security proof, we construct a meta-simulator that uses the simulators of F-SUE and P-SUE schemes in Theorem 3.1 as sub-simulators instead of constructing a simulator directly from the q-sRW1 assumption. This meta-simulator greatly simplifies the description of the security proof since private keys and the challenge ciphertext header can be generated by the sub-simulators. The detailed security proof is given as follows:
Theorem 4.3. The above TI-SUE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-sRW1 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above TI-SUE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the q-sRW1 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
) and Z where Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc or Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) f . Let B F-SUE be a simulator of F-SUE and B P-SUE be a simulator of P-SUE. Then B that interacts with A and internally runs two simulators B F-SUE and B P-SUE is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits challenge times T * L , T * R . B first runs B F-SUE and B P-SUE by giving the challenge tuple D and Z. Setup: B submits T * L to B F-SUE and receives PP F-SUE , and it submits T * R to B P-SUE and receives PP P-SUE . It implicitly sets β = ab and publishes the public parameters PP = PP F-SUE , PP P-SUE , Ω = e(g a , g b ) . Query 1: A adaptively request a private key for a time T with the restrictions T < T * L or T * R < T . B proceeds as follows:
It first requests a private key for the time T to B F-SUE and obtains SK F-SUE,T . Next, it selects a random exponent β ∈ Z p and obtains SK F-SUE,T by running F-SUE.RandKey(SK F-SUE,T , −β , PP F-SUE ). It also obtains SK P-SUE,T by running P-SUE.GenKey(T, β , PP P-SUE ). It sets a private key SK T = SK F-SUE,T , SK P-SUE,T .
• Case T > T * R : It first requests a private key for the time T to B P-SUE and obtains SK P-SUE,T . Next, it selects a random exponent β ∈ Z p and obtains SK P-SUE,T by running P-SUE.RandKey(SK P-SUE,T , −β , PP P-SUE ). It also obtains SK F-SUE,T by running F-SUE.GenKey(T, β , PP F-SUE ). It sets a private key SK T = SK F-SUE,T , SK P-SUE,T . To finish the proof, we should show that the simulation is correct. The public parameters is correct since PP F-SUE and PP P-SUE share the same generator g that is given in the assumption, B F-SUE internally sets β = ab, and B P-SUE internally sets β = ab. Now we show that private keys are correctly generated. In case of T < T * L , an F-SUE private key is generated with a master key ab − β is used by the help of B F-SUE and a P-SUE private key is generated with a master key β . In case of T > T * R , an F-SUE private key is generated with a master key β and a P-SUE private key is generated with a master key ab − β by the help of B P-SUE . Finally, we show that the challenge ciphertext header is correctly generated. The F-SUE challenge ciphertext header and the P-SUE challenge ciphertext header are correctly generated since the same element g c of the assumption is used in two simulators. If Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc , then EK is correctly distributed. Otherwise, EK is a random element in G T . We omit the analysis of the probability. This completes our proof.
Corollary 4.4. The above TI-SUE scheme is fully secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-sRW 1 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
(λ ).
Revocable-Storage Attribute-Based Encryption
In this section, we propose an efficient RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters that supports the large universe of attributes, and prove its security under a q-type assumption.
Access Structures
In this subsection, we present the definition of access structures. Note that the access structures for attributebased encryption can be realized by linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS) [12] . We omit the definition of LSSS.
Definition 5.1 (Access Structure). Let U be the attribute universe. An access structure on U is a collection A of non-empty sets of attributes, i.e. A ⊆ 2 U \ {}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets. Additionally, an access structure is called monotone if ∀B,C ∈ A : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A.
Definitions
Revocable-storage attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE) is a new extension of ABE, introduced by Sahai et al. [24] , that enhances the security of ciphertexts that are stored in cloud storage by providing user revocation and ciphertext updating functionalities. In RS-ABE, a ciphertext associated with an access structure A and a time T is stored in cloud storage. A user has a private key with a set of attributes S and he obtains an additional update key associated with an update time T and a revoked user set R from a center. If S ∈ A and the user is not revoked in R at the time T , then he can decrypt the ciphertext in cloud storage by using his private key and update key. Additionally, the administrator of cloud storage can update the time T of a ciphertext to a new time T + 1 by using the public parameters to prevent a revoked users from accessing the past ciphertext. The formal syntax of RS-ABE is defined as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Revocable-Storage Attribute-Based Encryption). A revocable-storage (ciphertext-policy) attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE) scheme for the universe of attributes U consists of seven PPT algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, Encrypt, UpdateCT, RandCT, and Decrypt, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1 λ , T max , N max ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , the maximum time T max , and the maximum number of users N max , and it outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
GenKey(S, u, MK, PP).
The key generation algorithm takes as input a set of attributes S ⊆ U, a user index u ∈ N , the master key MK, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a private key SK S,u .
UpdateKey(T, R, MK, PP)
. The key update algorithm takes as input a time T ≤ T max , a set of revoked users R ⊆ N , the master key MK, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs an update key UK T,R .
DeriveKey(SK S,u ,UK T,R , PP). The decryption key derivation algorithm takes as input a private key SK S,u , an update key UK T,R , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a decryption key DK S,T or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
Encrypt(A, T, M, PP)
. The encryption algorithm takes as input an access structure A, a time T ≤ T max , a message M, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a ciphertext CT A,T .
UpdateCT(CT A,T , T + 1, PP). The ciphertext update algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT A,T , a new time T + 1 with T + 1 ≤ T max , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs an updated ciphertext CT A,T +1 .
RandCT(CT A,T , PP). The ciphertext randomization algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT A,T and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a re-randomized ciphertext CT A,T .
Decrypt(CT A,T , DK S,T , PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT A,T , a decryption key DK S,T , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a message M or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
The correctness of RS-ABE is defined as follows: For all PP, MK generated by Setup, all S and u, any SK S,u generated by GenKey, all A, T , and M, any CT A,T generated by Encrypt or UpdateCT, all T and R, any UK T ,R generated by UpdateKey, it is required that:
• If u / ∈ R, then DeriveKey(SK S,u ,UK T ,R , PP) = DK S,T .
• If u ∈ R, then DeriveKey(SK S,u ,UK T ,R , PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
• If (S / ∈ A) ∨ (T < T ), then Decrypt(CT A,T , DK S,T , PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The security model of RS-ABE was defined by Sahai et al. [24] . We extend their security model to consider the decryption key exposure attacks, introduced by Seo and Emura [26] , and define the selective revocation list model. In the security game of this model, an adversary initially submits a challenge access structure A * , a challenge time T * , a set of revoked users R * at the time T * . After that, he can adaptively request a private, an update, and decryption key that satisfy additional conditions. In the challenge step, he submits challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 and receives a challenge ciphertext CT * for A * , T * , and M * µ where µ is a random coin. The adversary may request additional key queries and finally he outputs a guess. If the guess is correct, then the adversary wins the game. The formal security model is described as follows: Definition 5.3 (Selective Revocation List Security). The selective revocation list security of RS-ABE is defined in terms of the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The security game is defined as the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Init: A first submits a challenge access structure A * , a challenge time T * , and the set of revoked users R * at the time T * .
2. Setup: C generates a master key MK and public parameters PP by running Setup(1 λ , T max , N max ), and it gives PP to A.
Query 1:
A may adaptively request a polynomial number of private keys, update keys, and decryption keys. C proceeds as follows:
• If this is a private key query for a set of attributes S and a user index u, then it gives the corresponding private key SK S,u to A by running GenKey(S, u, MK, PP). Note that A is allowed to query only one private key for each user u.
• If this is an update key query for a time T and a set of revoked users R, then it gives the corresponding update key UK T,R to A by running UpdateKey(T, R, MK, PP). Note that A is allowed to query only one update key for each time T .
• If this is a decryption key query for a set of attributes S and a time T , then it gives the corresponding decryption key DK S,T to A.
We require restrictions on the queries of A as follows:
(a) If an update key for T and R was queried, then R ⊆ R j for all update key queries on T j and R j where T < T j .
(b) If a private key for S and u that satisfies S ∈ A * was queried, then an update key for T j and R j that satisfies u ∈ R j and T j ≤ T * should be queried to revoke this user index u.
(c) A decryption key for S and T that satisfies S ∈ A * and T ≥ T * was not queried.
Challenge:
A submits challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 ∈ M of equal length. C chooses a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and gives a challenge ciphertext CT * to A by running Encrypt(A * , T * , M * µ , PP).
Query 2:
A may continue to request private keys, update keys, and decryption keys subject to the same restrictions as before, and C gives corresponding keys to A.
6.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv
RS-ABE
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the game. An RS-ABE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the above game is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Subset Cover Framework
The subset cover framework, introduced by Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [19] , is a general framework to construct a broadcast encryption scheme. The complete subtree (CS) scheme is one instance of the subset cover framework. We define this CS scheme as the same as that of Lee et al. [14] by excluding the key assigning part. The CS scheme is described as follows:
CS.Setup(N max ): This algorithm takes as input the maximum number of users N max . Let N max = 2 d for simplicity. It first sets a full binary tree BT of depth d. Each user is assigned to a different leaf node in BT . The collection S of CS is {S i : v i ∈ BT }. Recall that S i is the set of all the leaves in the subtree T i . It outputs the full binary tree BT .
CS.Assign(BT , u):
This algorithm takes as input the tree BT and a user u ∈ N . Let v u be the leaf node of BT that is assigned to the user u. Let (v j 0 , v j 1 , . . . , v j d ) be the path from the root node v j 0 = v 0 to the leaf node v j n = v u . It sets PV u = {S j 0 , . . . , S j d }, and outputs the private set PV u .
CS.Cover(BT , R):
This algorithm takes as input the tree BT and a revoked set R of users. It first computes the Steiner tree ST (R). Let T i 1 , . . . T i m be all the subtrees of BT that hang off ST (R), that is all subtrees whose roots v i 1 , . . . v i m are not in ST (R) but adjacent to nodes of outdegree 1 in ST (R). It outputs a covering set CV R = {S i 1 , . . . , S i m }.
CS.Match(CV R , PV u ):
This algorithm takes input as a covering set CV R = {S i 1 , . . . , S i m } and a private set PV u = {S j 0 , . . . , S j d }. It finds a subset S k such that S k ∈ CV R and S k ∈ PV u . If there is such a subset, it outputs (S k , S k ). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Lemma 5.4 ( [19]
). Let N max be the number of leaf nodes in a full binary tree and r be the size of a revoked set. In the CS scheme, the size of a private set is O(log N max ) and the size of a covering set is at most r log(N max /r).
Construction
To construct an RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters, we combine the CP-ABE scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [23] , our SUE scheme with short public parameters, and the CS scheme by following the design principle of Lee et al. [14] . To simplify the design and proof of our RS-ABE scheme, we additionally define private key randomization and ciphertext randomization algorithms for the CP-ABE scheme. The key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) version of the CP-ABE scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [23] is described as follows:
CP-ABE.Setup(GDS):
This algorithm takes as input a group description string GDS. It chooses random elements w A , v A , u A , h A ∈ G, and a random exponent γ ∈ Z p . It outputs the master key MK = γ and the public parameters as
CP-ABE.GenKey(S, MK, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a set of attributes S = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k }, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It chooses random exponents r, r 1 , . . . , r k ∈ Z p and outputs a private key that implicitly includes S as
CP-ABE.RandKey(SK S , δ , PP): This algorithm takes as input a private key
for a set of attributes S = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k }, an exponent δ ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It chooses random exponents r , r 1 , . . . , r k ∈ Z p and outputs a re-randomized private key as
CP-ABE.Encrypt(A,t, PP): This algorithm takes as input an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ) where M is an l × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row M j of M to an attribute ρ( j), a random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It first sets a random vector v = (t, v 2 , . . . , v n ) by selecting random exponents v 2 , . . . , v n ∈ Z p . It selects random exponents s 1 , . . . , s l ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext header that implicitly includes A as
A h A ) s j } 1≤ j≤l and a session key EK = Λ t .
CP-ABE.RandCT(CH A ,t , PP):
This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH A for an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ), a new random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It first sets a new vector v = (t , v 2 , . . . , v n ) by selecting random exponents v 2 , . . . , v n ∈ Z p . It selects random exponents s 1 , . . . , s l ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext header as
A h A ) s j } 1≤ j≤l and a partial session key EK = Λ t that will be multiplied with the session of CH A .
CP-ABE.Decrypt(CH A , SK S , PP):
This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH A for an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ), a private key SK S for a set of attributes S, and the public parameters PP. If S ∈ A, then it computes constants ω j ∈ Z p that satisfy ∑ ρ( j)∈S ω j M j = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and outputs a session key as
Let M be G T . Our RS-ABE scheme that uses the above CP-ABE scheme, our SUE scheme, and the CS scheme is described as follows:
RS-ABE.Setup(1 λ , T max , N max ): It first generates bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. It sets GDS = ((p, G, G T , e), g). It obtains MK ABE , PP ABE and MK SUE , PP SUE by running CP-ABE.Setup(GDS) and SUE.Setup(GDS, T max ) respectively. It also obtains BT by running CS.Setup(N max ) and assigns a random exponent γ i ∈ Z p to each node v i in BT . It selects a random exponent α ∈ Z p , and then it outputs the master secret key MK = (MK ABE , MK SUE , α, BT ) and the public parameters as PP = PP ABE , PP SUE , g = g 1 , Ω = e(g, g) α . . If u / ∈ R, then it obtains (S i , S j ) by running CS.Match(CV R , PV u ). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Next, it selects a random exponent δ ∈ Z p and obtains SK ABE and SK SUE by running CP-ABE.RandKey(δ , SK ABE, j , PP ABE ) and SUE.RandKey(−δ , SK SUE,i , PP SUE ) respectively. It outputs a decryption key as DK S,T = SK ABE , SK SUE .
RS-ABE.GenKey(S,
u
RS-ABE.Encrypt(A, T, M, PP):
It selects a random exponent t ∈ Z p and obtains CH ABE and CH SUE by running CP-ABE.Encrypt(A,t, PP ABE ) and SUE.Encrypt(T,t, PP SUE ) respectively. Note that it ignores two partial session keys that are returned by CP-ABE.Encrypt and SUE.Encrypt. It outputs a ciphertext that implicitly includes T as CT A,T = CH ABE ,CH SUE ,C = Ω t · M . 
RS-ABE.UpdateCT(CT
A,T , T + 1, PP): Let CT A,T = (CH ABE ,CH SUE ,C
Correctness
The correctness of RS-ABE can be obtained from the correctness of CP-ABE, SUE, and CS schemes. Let SK S,u be a private key with a set of attributes S and an index u and UK T ,R be an update key with an update time T and a set of revoked users R. If u / ∈ R, then the decryption key derivation algorithm can correctly derive a decryption key DK S,T = (SK ABE,S , SK SUE,T ) by the correctness of the CS scheme. Note that SK ABE,S has γ i + δ as a master key and SK SUE,T has α − γ i − δ as a master key. Let CT A,T be a ciphertext with an access structure A and a time T and DK S,T be a decryption key with a set of attributes S and a time T . If S ∈ A and T ≤ T , then one partial session key is derived from the correctness of the CP-ABE scheme and another partial session key also is derived from the correctness of the SUE scheme. Finally the session key is obtained by multiplying two partial session keys.
Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RS-ABE scheme, we cannot reduce the security of CP-ABE or SUE to that of RS-ABE since our RS-ABE scheme uses a simple secret sharing scheme to share the master key to prevent collusion attacks instead of using CP-ABE and SUE schemes as black-boxes. However, we can simplify the description of the security proof by constructing a meta-simulator that runs the simulators of CP-ABE and SUE as sub-simulators. To construct a meta-simulator, we slightly modify the original simulator of the CP-ABE scheme to meet additional conditions for the meta-simulation. The detailed description of the security proof is given as follows: The original simulator of the above CP-ABE scheme in [23] implicitly sets γ = a q+1 + γ by selecting a random exponent γ ∈ Z p and sets w A = g a where a and q are set in the q-RW1 assumption. To use this simulator for the security proof of RS-ABE, we slightly modify this simulator to implicitly sets γ = a q+1 and sets w A = g a g w by selecting a random exponent w ∈ Z p . The simulation of private keys and the challenge ciphertext also should be slightly modified, but this modification is easy. Note that this modified simulator sets g of PP as that in the assumption, implicitly sets γ = a q+1 , and sets g t of the challenge ciphertext header as g c of the assumption. Theorem 5.6. The above RS-ABE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-RW1 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RS-ABE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A meta-simulator B that solves the q-RW1 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
and Z where Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) a q+1 c or Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) f . Note that a challenge tuple D q-sRW 1 for the q-sRW1 assumption can be easily derived from the challenge tuple D of the q-RW1 assumption by setting b = a q . Let B ABE be a modified simulator in the security proof of Theorem 5.5 and B SUE be a simulator in the security proof of Theorem 3.1. Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge access structure A * , a challenge time T * , and a set of revoked users R * at the time T * . B first runs B ABE by giving D and Z, and it also runs B SUE by giving D q-sRW 1 and Z. It obtains BT by running CS.Setup and assigns a random exponent γ i ∈ Z p to each node v i in BT . For each user u i ∈ R * , it randomly assigns the user u i to a leaf node v u i ∈ BT . Let RV * be the set of leaf nodes that are randomly assigned for R * . Recall that Path(v) is the set of path nodes from the root node to the leaf node v. That is, Path(v) = {v j 0 , . . . , v j d } where v j 0 is the root node and v j d is the leaf node where v j d = v. Let RevTree(RV * ) be the minimal subtree that connects the root node to all leaf nodes in RV * . That is, RevTree(RV * ) = v u ∈RV * Path(v u ). Setup: B submits A * to B ABE and receives PP ABE , and it submits T * to B SUE and receives PP SUE . It randomizes Λ of PP ABE and Λ of PP SUE by selecting random exponents γ , β ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets α = a q+1 and gives the public parameters PP = PP ABE , PP SUE , Ω = e(g a , g a q ) to A. Query 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries. If this is a private key query for a set of attributes S and a user index u, then B proceeds as follows:
• Case u ∈ R * : In this case, it can simply creates ABE private keys for path nodes if it uses γ i from BT for the master key of ABE.
1. It first retrieves the leaf node v u ∈ RV * that is assigned to the user u. 2. For all v j k ∈ Path(v u ), it obtains SK ABE,k by running CP-ABE.GenKey(S, γ j k , PP ABE )
3. It creates the private key SK S,u = PV u , SK ABE,0 , . . . , SK ABE,d .
• Case u ∈ R * : In this case, it can use B ABE to generate ABE private keys since A can only request S that satisfies S ∈ A * .
1. It first queries an ABE private key for S to B ABE and receives SK S . 3. For all v j k ∈ RevTree(RV * )∩Path(v u ), it obtains SK ABE,k by running CP-ABE.GenKey(S, γ j k , PP ABE ).
4. For all v j k ∈ Path(v u )\(RevTree(RV * )∩Path(v u )), it obtains SK ABE,k by running CP-ABE.RandKey (SK S , −γ j k , PP ABE ).
It creates the private key
If this is an update key query for a time T and a revoked set R, then B proceeds as follows:
• Case T < T * : In this case, it can use B SUE to generate SUE private keys since A can only request T such that T < T * .
1. It first queries an SUE private key for T to B SUE and receives SK SUE .
2. It obtains CV R by running CS.Cover(BT , R). Let Cover(R) = {v i 1 , . . . , v i m } be the set of nodes that are associated with CV R . It retrieves exponents {γ i 1 , . . . , γ i m } from BT that are associated with Cover(R).
5. It creates the update key UK T,R = (CV R , SK SUE,1 , . . . , SK SUE,m ).
• Case T ≥ T * : In this case, it can simply create SUE private keys if it uses γ i from BT for the master key of SUE. Note that if T ≥ T * , then RevTree(RV * )∩Cover(R) = / 0 since R * ⊆ R from the definition of the security model.
1. It first obtains CV R by running CS.Cover(BT , R). Let Cover(R) = {v i 1 , . . . , v i m } be the set of nodes that are associated with CV R . It retrieves exponents {γ i 1 , . . . , γ i m } from BT that are associated with Cover(R).
2. For all v i k ∈ Cover(R), it obtains SK SUE,k by running SUE.GenKey(T, γ i k , PP SUE ).
3. It creates the update key UK T,R = (CV R , SK SUE,1 , . . . , SK SUE,m ).
If this is a decryption key query for a set of attributes S and a time T , then B proceeds as follows:
• Case S / ∈ A * : In this case, it can use B ABE to generate an ABE private key since S / ∈ A * .
1. It first queries an ABE private key for S to B ABE and receives SK ABE .
2. It selects a random exponent δ ∈ Z p and obtains SK ABE and SK SUE by running CP-ABE.RandKey (SK S , −δ , PP ABE ) and SUE.GenKey(T, δ , PP SUE ) respectively.
3. It creates the decryption key DK S,T = SK ABE , SK SUE .
• Case S ∈ A * : In this case, we have T < T * from the restriction of the security model. It uses B SUE to generate an SUE private key since T < T * .
2. It selects a random exponent δ ∈ Z p and obtains SK ABE and SK SUE by running CP-ABE.GenKey (S, δ , PP ABE ) and SUE.RandKey(SK SUE , −δ , PP SUE ) respectively.
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 . B queries an ABE challenge ciphertext header to B ABE and receives CH * ABE . B also queries an SUE challenge ciphertext header to B SUE and receives CH * SUE . Finally, it flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1} and creates the challenger ciphertext CT * = (CH * ABE ,CH * SUE ,C * = Z · M * µ ) and gives it to A. Query 2: Same as Query 1. Guess: A outputs a guess µ . If µ = µ , then B outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we should show that the simulation is correct. The public parameters is correct since PP ABE and PP SUE share the same generator g that is given in the assumption, B ABE internally sets γ = a q+1 , and B SUE internally sets β = a q+1 . Now we show that private keys are correctly generated. In case of u ∈ R * , an ABE private key with a node v j k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is correctly generated with a master key γ j k is used. In case of u ∈ R * , an ABE private key with a node v j k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is generated with a master key γ j k and an ABE private key with a node v j k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is generated with a master key a q+1 − γ j k by the help of B ABE . Note that the master key assignment for each node is consistent in the simulation of private keys. Next, we show that update keys are correctly generated. In case of T < T * , an SUE private key with a node v i k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is generated with a master key a q+1 − γ i k by the help of B SUE and an SUE private key with a node v i k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is generated with a master key γ i k . In case of T ≥ T * , an SUE private key with a node v i k ∈ RevTree(RV * ) is generated with a master key γ i k since RevTree(RV * ) ∩ Cover(R) = / 0. 
Let U be the universe of attributes, N max be the maximum number of users, T max be the maximum number of times, S be the set of attributes in ciphertexts, r be the number of revoked users in update keys, and l be the row size of access structures. Sizes for public parameters (PP), private keys (SK), update keys (UK), and ciphertexts (CT) count group elements. P stands for pairing computation.
Note that the master key assignment for each node in the simulation of update keys is consistent with that of private keys. We also show that decryption keys are correctly generated. In case of S / ∈ A * , an ABE private key is generated with a master key a q+1 − δ by the help of B ABE and an SUE private key is generated with a master key δ . In case of (S ∈ A * ) ∧ (T < T * ), an ABE private key is generated with a master key δ and an SUE private key is generated with a master key a q+1 − δ by the help of B SUE . Finally, we show that the challenge ciphertext is correctly generated. The ABE challenge ciphertext header and the SUE challenge ciphertext header are correctly generated since the same element g c of the assumption is used in two simulators. If Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) a q+1 c , then C * is correctly distributed. Otherwise, C * is independent of µ since Z 1 is a random element in G T . We omit the analysis of the probability. This completes our proof.
Discussions
Efficiency Analysis. In our RS-ABE scheme, the public parameters consist of O(1) group elements, a private key consists of O(log N max * |S|) group elements, an update key consists of O(r log(N max /r) * log T max ) group elements, a decryption key consists of O(|S| + log T max ) group elements, and a ciphertext consists of O(l + log T max ) group elements where N max is the maximum number users, S is the set of attributes, T max is the maximum number of times, r is the number of revoked users, and l is the row size of an access structure. Compared with the efficient RS-ABE scheme of Lee et al. [14] in which the public parameters consist of O(|U| + log T max ) group elements where U is the universe of attributes, our RS-ABE scheme is very efficient since the public parameters consist of just O(1) group elements. The comparison of RS-ABE schemes is given in Table 2 .
Supporting a Time Interval. Our RS-ABE scheme does not support a time interval since it just uses the SUE scheme of Section 3. To construct an RS-ABE scheme that supports a time interval, we can combine the CP-ABE scheme, the TI-SUE scheme of Section 4, and the CS scheme. RS-ABE schemes with a time interval are very useful in applications where it is required that encrypted files in a cloud storage should be only decrypted within a specified time interval. The security of this RS-ABE scheme can be proven under the q-RW1 assumption by using the similar meta-simulation technique of Theorem 5.6. We omit the detailed proof.
RS-ABE with Key-Policy. By combining our SUE scheme with the key-policy ABE scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [23] , we can obtain an RS-ABE scheme with key-policy where an access structure is specified in a private key and a set of attributes is associated with a ciphertext. Our RS-ABE scheme with key-policy is described in Section 6. This RS-ABE scheme also has short parameters and supports a large universe of attributes. To prove the security of this RS-ABE scheme, we use a different q-type assumption proposed by Rouselakis and Waters.
RS-ABE with Key-Policy
In this section, we propose an efficient RS-ABE scheme with key-policy and prove its security under a qtype assumption. The definition and the security model of RS-ABE with key-policy can be easily obtained from that of RS-ABE with ciphertext-policy in Section 5.2.
Construction
The KEM version of the KP-ABE scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [23] is described as follows:
KP-ABE.Setup(GDS):
KP-ABE.GenKey(A, MK, PP): This algorithm takes as input an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ) where M is an l × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row M j of M to an attribute ρ( j), the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It first sets a random vector v = (γ, v 2 , . . . , v n ) by selecting random exponents v 2 , . . . , v n ∈ Z p . It chooses random exponents r 1 , . . . , r l ∈ Z p and outputs a private key that implicitly includes A as
KP-ABE.RandKey(SK S , δ , PP): This algorithm takes as input a private key SK A = ({K j,0 , K j,1 , K j,2 }) for an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ), an exponent δ ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It first sets a random vector v = (δ , v 2 , . . . , v n ) by selecting random exponents v 2 , . . . , v n ∈ Z p . It chooses random exponents r 1 , . . . , r l ∈ Z p and outputs a re-randomized private key as
KP-ABE.Encrypt(S,t, PP):
This algorithm takes as input a set of attributes S = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k }, a random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext header that implicitly includes S as
A } 1≤i≤k and a session key EK = Λ t .
KP-ABE.RandCT(CH A ,t , PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header
for a set of attributes S = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k }, a new random exponent t ∈ Z p , and the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext header as
A } 1≤i≤k and a partial session key EK = Λ t that will be multiplied with the session of CH S .
KP-ABE.Decrypt(CH A , SK S , PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH S for a set of attributes S, a private key SK A for an LSSS access structure A = (M, ρ), and the public parameters PP.
If S ∈ A, then it computes constants ω j ∈ Z p that satisfy ∑ ρ( j)∈S ω j M j = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and outputs a session key as
The RS-ABE scheme with key-policy is almost the same as the scheme in Section 5.4 except that the CP-ABE scheme is replaced by the KP-ABE scheme. We omit the description of our RS-ABE scheme with key-policy.
Complexity Assumptions
To prove the security of our RS-ABE scheme with key-policy, we use the q-RW2 assumption that was introduced by Rouselakis and Waters [23] to prove the security of their KP-ABE scheme. From this assumption, we introduce a simplified version of the q-RW2 assumption to prove the security of our SUE scheme in Section 3.
Assumption 6.1 (q-RW2 1 , [23] ). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. The q-RW2 assumption is that if the challenge tuple
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c, {d j } 1≤ j≤q , f ∈ Z p .
Lemma 6.2 ( [23]
). The q-RW2 assumption holds in the generic group model. Assumption 6.3 (q-simplified RW2, q-sRW2). Let (p, G, G T , e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. The q-sRW2 assumption is that if the challenge tuple
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c, {d j } 1≤ j≤q , f ∈ Z p . Lemma 6.4. The q-sRW2 assumption holds in the generic group model if the q-RW2 assumption holds in the generic group model.
The proof of this Lemma is easily obtained since all elements of the q-sRW2 assumption are contained in the elements of the q-RW2 assumption. 1 In [23] , there is a mistake in the description of the assumption. We correct it by changing g abcd j /d j to g abcd j /d 
Security Analysis
To simplify the proof of our RS-ABE scheme with key-policy, we first prove the security of our SUE scheme under the q-sRW2 assumption. Note that we already proved the security of our SUE scheme under the qsRW1 assumption.
Theorem 6.5. The SUE scheme in Section 3.2 is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-sRW2 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 except that {g ac/d j } are embedded in v whereas {g a/d j } are embedded in v of Theorem 3.1. Because of this change, the randomness for a private key and the randomness for the challenge ciphertext header are slightly changed. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above SUE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the q-sRW2 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
) and Z where Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc or Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) f . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: It is the same as that of Theorem 3.1. Setup: B first chooses random exponents w , v , u , h ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets β = ab and publishes the public parameters PP as
Challenge: To create the challenge ciphertext for the challenge time T * , B proceeds as follows:
1. It first sets a label string L * ∈ {0, 1} d by computing ψ(T * ). It chooses random exponents s 1 , . . . ,
and proceeds as follows: Let d ( j) be the length of L ( j) and k be an index for
, it sets CH ( j) as an empty one. Otherwise, it selects s d ( j) ∈ Z p and creates ciphertext components CH ( j) as
3. It removes all empty CH ( j) and sets CH T = CH (0) , . . . ,CH (d ) for some d that consists of non-empty CH ( j) .
. This completes our proof. Note that the simulators of Theorem 6.5 and Theorem 6.6 satisfy three conditions for meta-simulation: 1) it sets g of PP as that in the assumption; 2) it implicitly sets the master key as ab where a, b are variables in the assumption; 3) it sets g t of the challenge ciphertext header as g c of the assumption.
Theorem 6.7. The above RS-ABE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if the q-RW2 assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
The proof of this theorem is almost the same as that of Theorem 5.6 since the simulator of Theorem 3.1 for the security proof of SUE and the simulator of Theorem 6.6 for the security proof of KP-ABE satisfy the three conditions for meta-simulation. We omit the proof of this theorem.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the first SUE scheme with short public parameters in prime-order bilinear groups and proved its security under a q-type assumption. We also presented two extensions of our SUE scheme: a TI-SUE scheme with short public parameters that supports time intervals and large universe RS-ABE schemes with short public parameters.
There are many interesting problems that are left. The first one is to devise an SUE scheme with short public parameters under standard assumptions. We expect that a new proof technique is needed since our SUE scheme uses the power of a q-type assumption. One possible approach is to use the dual system encryption method of Waters [28] . The second one is to construct a large universe RS-ABE scheme with short public parameters that is fully secure. The RS-ABE scheme of Lee et al. [14] is fully secure, but the size of public parameters is not short and only a small universe of attributes is supported. The third one is to devise an RS-ABE scheme that uses the subset difference (SD) scheme for revocation instead of using the CS scheme. If the SD scheme can be used, then the size of update keys that should be broadcasted at each time period can be reduced. Recently, Lee et al. [15] proposed an RIBE scheme that uses the SD scheme, but they claimed that their technique cannot be directly applicable to construct an RS-ABE scheme.
[ 
A Definition of Ciphertext Delegatable Encryption
Ciphertext delegatable encryption (CDE) is a new type of PKE, in which a ciphertext with a label L can be delegated to a new ciphertext with a label L if L is a prefix of L . The concept of CDE was introduced by Lee et al. [14] to construct an SUE scheme. The formal syntax of CDE is described as follows:
Definition A.1 (Ciphertext Delegatable Encryption). A ciphertext delegatable encryption (CDE) scheme for the set L of labels consists of seven PPT algorithms Init, Setup, GenKey, Encrypt, DelegateCT, RandCT, and Decrypt, which are defined as follows:
Setup(GDS, l). The setup algorithm takes as input a group description string GDS and the maximum length l of the label strings, and it outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
GenKey(L, MK, PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input a label string L ∈ {0, 1} n with n ≤ l, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a private key SK L .
Encrypt(L, PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d with d ≤ l and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a ciphertext header CH L and a session key EK.
DelegateCT(CH L , c, PP). The ciphertext delegation algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH L for a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d with d < l, a bit value c ∈ {0, 1}, and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a delegated ciphertext header CH L for the label string L = L c.
RandCT(CH L , PP). The ciphertext randomization algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH L for a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d with d < l and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a re-randomized ciphertext header CH L and a partial session key EK .
Decrypt(CH L , SK L , PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH L , a private key SK L , and the public parameters PP, and it outputs a session key EK or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
The correctness of CDE is defined as follows: For all MK, PP generated by Setup, any SK L generated by GenKey, any CH L and EK generated by Encrypt or DelegateCT, it is required that:
• If L is not a prefix of L , then Decrypt(CH L , SK L , PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The security model of CDE was introduced by Lee et al. [14] and we follow the selective security model version of their security definition. The security is defined as follows: Definition A.2 (Selective Security). The selective security of CDE is defined in terms of the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The security game is defined as the following experiment between a challenger C and a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A:
1. Init: A initially submits a challenge label string L * .
Query 1:
A may adaptively request a polynomial number of private keys for label strings L 1 , . . . , L q , and C gives the corresponding private keys SK L 1 , . . . , SK L q to A by running GenKey(L i , MK, PP) with the following restriction: For any label string L i of private key queries, it is required that L * is not a prefix of L i .
4.
Challenge: C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes a ciphertext header CH * and a session key EK * by running Encrypt(L * , PP). If b = 0, then it gives CH * and EK * to A. Otherwise, it gives CH * and a random session key to A.
Query 2:
A may continue to request private keys for additional label strings L q +1 , . . . , L q subject to the same restriction as before, and C gives the corresponding private keys to A.
6.
Guess: Finally A outputs a bit b .
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the game. A CDE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the above game is negligible in the security parameter λ .
We can also define the full model that is stronger than the selective model of CDE. In the full model, an adversary submits a label string L * at the challenge step instead of the init step.
B SUE under Standard Assumptions
In this section, we propose an SUE scheme with shorter public parameters and prove its selective security under the standard assumption.
B.1 Construction
To devise an SUE scheme under the standard assumption, we modify the SUE scheme in Section 3 by slightly increasing the number of group elements in public parameters. In the security proof of Section 3, we can program multiple challenge labels to short public parameters by the help of the q-type assumption, but we cannot use this programming technique in the standard assumption. However, the number of group elements in public parameters is just proportional to the depth of a binary tree since the challenge labels is just proportional to the depth of the tree. Note that this SUE scheme has shorter public parameters compared with the SUE scheme of Lee et al. [14] in prime-order bilinear groups. Our CDE scheme is described as follows:
CDE.Init(1 λ ): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ . It generates bilinear groups G, G T of prime order p. Let g be the generator of G. It outputs a group description string as GDS = (p, G, G T , e), g .
CDE.Setup(GDS, l):
This algorithm takes as input the string GDS and the maximum length l of label strings. It chooses random elements w, v, u, {h i,0 , h i,1 } l i=1 ∈ G and a random exponent β ∈ Z p . We define g, g) β .
CDE.GenKey(L, MK, PP): This algorithm takes as input a label string L ∈ {0, 1} n where n ≤ l, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents r, r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and outputs a private key that implicitly includes L as
CDE.Encrypt(L,t, s, PP): This algorithm takes as input a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d where d ≤ l, a random exponent t ∈ Z p , a vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s d ) ∈ Z d p of random exponents, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext header that implicitly includes L as
and a session key as EK = Λ t . 
CDE.DelegateCT(CH
CDE.Decrypt(CH L , SK L , PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext header CH L for a label string L ∈ {0, 1} d , a private key SK L = (K 0 , K 1 , {K i,1 , K i,2 } n i=1 ) for a label string L ∈ {0, 1} n where d ≤ n ≤ l, and the public parameters PP. If L is a prefix of L , then it derives CH L = (C 0 ,C 1 , {C i,1 ,C i,2 } n i=1 ) by iteratively running DelegateCT and outputs a session key as
e(C i,1 , K i,1 ) · e(C i,2 , K i,2 )
The description of our SUE scheme is almost the same as that of Section 3. We omit the description of the SUE scheme.
B.2 Security Analysis
To prove the security of above SUE scheme, we use the partitioning method. In the preparation of public parameters, a simulator can program only one challenge label to one element. The detailed description of the security proof is given as follows:
Theorem B.1. The above SUE scheme is selectively secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the DBDH assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above SUE scheme with a non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p, G, G T , e), g, g a , g b , g c ) and Z where Z = Z 0 = e(g, g) abc or Z = Z 1 = e(g, g) d . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge time T * . B first obtains a challenge label L * that is associated with the challenge time T * by computing L * = ψ(T * ). Recall that TimeLabels(L) = {L} ∪ RightSibling(Path(L)) \ Path(Parent(L)). We define TL(L * , i, j) be a function that returns a label string L in TimeLabels(L * ) where the length of L is i and L[i] = j. Note that TL(L * , i, j) return 0 if there is no label string for i and j. Setup: B first chooses random exponents w , v , u , {h i, j } ∀1≤i≤l,∀ j∈{0,1} ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets β = ab and publishes the public parameters PP as g, w = g a g w , v = g a g v , u = g a g u , h i, j = (g a ) −TL(L * ,i, j) g h i, j ∀1≤i≤l,∀ j∈{0,1}
, Λ = e(g a , g b ).
Query 1: A adaptively request a private key for a time T with the restriction T < T * . B first obtains a label string L ∈ {0, 1} n by computing ψ(T ). Next, it selects random exponent r , r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and creates a private key by implicitly setting r = −b + r ,
Note that if T < T * , then it can create a private key since Path(L) ∩ TimeLabels(L * ) = / 0 where L = ψ(T ). Challenge: To create the challenge ciphertext for the challenge time T * , B proceeds as follows: , it sets CH ( j) as an empty one. Otherwise, it selects s d ( j) ∈ Z p and creates ciphertext components CH ( j) as
Note that it can create the challenge ciphertext for T * since for all labels L ( j) in the challenge ciphertext, L ( j) ∈ TimeLabels(L * ). Query 2: Same as Query 1.
Note that the term g ab of K i,1 that is not given in the assumption is cancelled since L| i − TL(L * , i, L[i]) = 0. The challenge ciphertext component CH ( j) is also correctly distributed as
Note that the term g ac of C 1 is cancelled and the term g ac of C d ( j) ,2 is not needed since
This completes our proof.
Corollary B.2. The above SUE scheme is fully secure under chosen plaintext attacks if the DBDH assumption holds. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv 
